Summary

Noemi Terzo discusses the formal security analysis of the Olvid Messenger, which relies heavily on Cas Cremers, Ruben Gonzalez, Peter Schwabe, Yuval Yarom, and Zhiyuan Zhang. This work establishes boundaries on how the system handles memory conflicts. The analysis highlights the critical role of formal methods in mitigating risks during deployment. Other contributions from the same team focus on enhancing defensive capabilities through advanced techniques like DisProving Spectre with Speculation-Passing. Additional papers detail the development of Transparent Decompilation for timing side-channel analyses. There is also strong emphasis on OOPSLA, where code Shing Hing William Cheng, Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup, Daniel Genkin, Dallas McNeil, and Zhiyuan Zhang contribute to improving security hybrid frameworks.

The team continues to apply these methodologies, presenting code and CVE-2024-1543 in the CHES conference. Their work includes the TEEM-Jam framework, which sub-caches memory lines to block access leakage. Yuv Lv, Rui Zhang, Zhiyuan Zhang, and Yuyao Wang further extend these efforts with SMASH, a scalable multi-party computing solution. These papers collectively demonstrate that while malicious actors seek to bypass security, the team successfully integrates sophisticated techniques to ensure privacy-preserving Large Language Models and memory access remain secure across distributed environments.

Title

About | Zhiyuan Zhang

Description

https://neo-outis.github.io/

Keywords

paper, security, code, peter, side, university, analysis, santiago, channel, daniel, tutor, research, chinese, philosophy, toby, murray, adelaide

NS Lookup

A 185.199.111.153, A 185.199.108.153, A 185.199.109.153, A 185.199.110.153

Dates

Created 2026-04-12

Updated 2026-04-13

Summarized 2026-04-15